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cIn my comment on Will Kymlicka’s (2015), very stimulating essay, I would like to
argue that his basic scheme is sound, but incomplete and that his proposal for the pro-
gressive forces falls short in several respects. To begin with, Will Kymlicka stresses, in
my view correctly, that the welfare state is built on national solidarity. The idea of the
‘people’s home’ (folkshemmet) of the Swedish Social Democrats, to which he refers in
his text, serves as a perfect illustration of this point. Even the ‘universalistic’ Nordic
welfare state intends to be universalistic within the boundaries of the national political
community only. The welfare state is, as Kymlicka underlines, generally tied to an
image of social membership, not to universal humanitarianism. In this respect it is im-
portant to keep in mind, as Kymlicka also argues, that the national community is con-
ceived in egalitarian terms: the two fundamental principles of the nation – popular
sovereignty and equality of all members of the national community – are at the same
time the two core principles of democracy (Greenfeld, 1992: 10). The idea of democ-
racy was, in Greenfeld’s nice formulation, contained in the idea of the nation like the
butterfly in the chrysalis. (Kymlicka, 2015).
Accordingly, Kymlicka (2015), suggests that appeals to national solidarity constitute
a resource for progressives. One might add that appeals to national solidarity fall on
particularly open ears among the poor, who identify more with the nation than the
rich, because they have less to be proud of in their immediate social group compared
to the rich and because they are more similar to the average member of their nation
(Shayo, 2009: 162). However, national solidarity is an ambiguous resource for progres-
sives – not only, as Kymlicka argues, because of its tendency to exclude groups not
perceived as belonging to the nation, but also for yet another reason: as Shayo (2009)
shows, people with a strong national identity are less supportive of redistribution in
general, and, at the macro-level, the most nationalistic countries are known for being
those with the least redistributive welfare states (and vice versa). The Swedes may
again serve as an illustrative example. They are comparatively (compared to the
Anglo-Saxon settler states, in particular) little nationalistic – class identities were rela-
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met’ did benefit from appeals to national solidarity, we should not forget that it was
above all constructed by a social movement based on class identities, a movement that,
in the process, succeeded in decisively shaping the Swedish national identity – con-
structing a ‘social democratic image of society,’ as Frank Castles (1978) has aptly put it.
However, as Kymlicka (2015), goes on in his argument, national solidarity is not only
a resource for progressives, but it also poses endemic risks for all those who are not
perceived as belonging to the nation. His list of excluded groups (indigenous peoples,
sub-state national groups and immigrants) is, however, incomplete. First of all, national
solidarity generally tends to exclude those members of the nation who are perceived as
undeserving – because they are perceived as not having appropriately contributed to
the common good (in violation of the norm of reciprocity), or because they are per-
ceived as abusing the common good (in violation of the norm of self-reliance). Second,
with respect to the non-nationals, we need to distinguish between immigrants on the
national territory and the residents of other nation-states. Thus, within the European
Union, not only the immigrants pose problems for national solidarity, but also the
claims of other member-states, as has been illustrated by the recent Euro-crisis and the
European refugees’ crisis: the Germans are called upon to be solidary not only with the
flood of refugees, but also with the Greeks. Third, with respect to immigrants in par-
ticular, we should distinguish between access to the national territory and integration
of those who have gotten access and are likely here to stay. To counter the endemic
risks of national solidarity, Kymlicka argues that we need multiculturalism. However, if
multiculturalism may contribute to counter the exclusion of the second and third type,
it may not at all help to counteract the exclusion of the first type. Moreover, the mea-
sures of multiculturalism it takes to enhance solidarity with other nations, or to grant
access to immigrants in the first place, may well be different from the measures de-
signed to integrate immigrants who are already more or less permanent residents in
one’s country.
The progressives’ dilemma, as Kymlicka (2015), sees it, derives from the fact that,
while we need multiculturalism to counteract the endemic risks of national solidar-
ity, it at the same time undermines national solidarity. For Kymlicka, this dilemma
is expressed by the stark contrast between neoliberal multiculturalism (inclusion
without solidarity) and welfare chauvinism (solidarity without inclusion). On the
one hand, multiculturalism may degenerate into a project of market inclusion ra-
ther than citizenship. On the other hand, national solidarity may degenerate into
welfare chauvinism – an attitude that supports a ‘system of social protection only
for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contrib-
uted to it’ (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995), and, I would add, into welfare populism –
an attitude that combines a sense of egalitarianism with the exclusion of the un-
deserving poor (De Koster, Achterberg & Van der Waal, 2012, Michel, 2015). The
way out proposed by Kymlicka constitutes a third option – solidarity with inclu-
sion. This way to frame the alternatives, however, leaves out a fourth option, which
has actually been the one originally embraced by the European radical populist
right and which, according to Kitschelt and McGann (1995), represented its ‘winning
formula’: nationalist neoliberalism, i.e., in Kymlicka’s terms, exclusion without solidarity.













Fig. 1 The four options for solidarity
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have always embraced the option of inclusive solidarity: they have always been solidary
(in the sense of attributing priority to the norm of equality over the norms of reci-
procity and self-reliance), and multicultural (in the sense of favoring international soli-
darity and inclusiveness of the national solidarity). The problem for the progressives is
that their traditional constituency has not followed suit, but has been attracted by the
appeals of the new populist right, which, in response to its success in the working class,
has gradually been shifting its position from its original nationalist neoliberalism to-
wards welfare chauvinism and welfare populism. As a result of these corresponding
shifts on the demand and the supply side of the political space, the progressives’ con-
stituency has become predominantly middle class. More specifically, it has become
dominated by the social and cultural professionals who form a key segment of the new
middle class and for whom the inclusive solidarity of the progressives has been most
appealing. Formulated in somewhat different terms, the dilemma of the progressives
(the left) is that they need to forge an alliance between their traditional and their new
constituencies both of whom agree in terms of national solidarity, but who could not
be more different in terms of inclusion. Or, more pointedly, the core of the dilemma of
the progressives is that their traditional constituency does not endorse
multiculturalism.
How to attenuate the opposition of the working class to multiculturalism? This is the
million dollar question. At this point, arguments about the relative weight of cultural
and economic threats typically enter the discussion, but, increasingly, I tend to think
that, in reality, the distinction between the two types of threat is difficult to make, be-
cause the borderline between the two is blurred (Häusermann & Kriesi, 2015): increas-
ing economic security is likely to attenuate the perception of cultural threats, just as
increasing cultural confidence is likely to attenuate the perception of economic insecur-
ity. I would like to suggest that the two kinds of threats have common roots – ignor-
ance, powerlessness, and disorientation – and require common countervailing
measures – ‘enlightened understanding’, as Dahl (1989, 1998) used to put it, empower-
ment and leadership. The emphasis on specific types of countervailing measures is
likely to vary, however, from one form of exclusion to the other. With respect to the
exclusion of those members of the national community who are perceived as
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information in the media about the (typically structurally determined) needs of the al-
legedly undeserving beneficiaries, about the (often rather limited) number of cases in-
volved, and about the prevailing (often quite judicious) administrative measures to deal
with these issues. This kind of factual information should help to dispel the beliefs
about violations of the norms of self-reliance and reciprocity. Of course, expecting this
kind of information to have the desired impact is a tall order, because such information
has to compete with the media’s penchant for reporting on individual cases of abuse
and with the individuals’ penchant for motivated reasoning, i.e., for receiving and
accepting only information that is in line with their biased preconceptions. With re-
spect to solidarity with other nations within the European Union, it is above all demo-
cratic empowerment that might help: to the extent that the democratic deficit of the
EU is alleviated, i.e., to the extent that European citizens are empowered to jointly de-
cide about their fate at the European level, they can be expected to develop a common
European identity and become a solidary European demos. This at least was the argu-
ment of Habermas’ (1995, 1998) ‘constitutional patriotism’: the democratic practice as
the precondition for the development of a common identity, which is in turn the precon-
dition for solidarity. The Swiss case may serve to illustrate the pertinence of Habermas’ ar-
gument (see Lacey, 2015). With respect to the access of immigrants, Ms. Merkel single-
handedly demonstrated during the summer 2015 to what extent political leadership can
make a difference. We might want to add that leadership does not end with bold declara-
tions, but ought to be followed up by administrative measures that credibly implement
these declarations. Finally, as far as the integration of immigrants who have already gotten
access to the country in question is concerned, enabling the immigrants to express their
culture and identity as modes of participating and contributing to the national society, as
proposed by Kymlicka (2015), in my view, indeed, constitutes a form of empowerment
that promises to contribute to their integration into the host society.
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